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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting defendant's 
motion to dismiss in which the district court concluded that Helmuth was not 
required to register under Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Act because 
ldaho Code 3 18-8304(1)(d) did not apply to out-of-state convictions. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Helmuth was charged with failure to register as a sex offender on July 22, 
2009. (R., pp. 14-15.) Specifically, the state alleged that Helrnuth failed to 
"provide written notice to the sheriff of the county where the offender [was] 
required to register, of a new address within two (2) days after he changed his 
address or actual residence . . . ." (Id.) 
Helmuth filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that none of the provisions of 
I.C. 3 ?8-8304 applied to hirn and that he was not required to register as a sex 
offender. (R., pp. 24-31.) In his motion to dismiss, Helmuth stipulated to the 
following facts: 
For the purposes of this motion only, the defendant agrees with the 
state's disclosure of evidence of two convictions in May 1992 for 
violations of Ohio Revised Code 2907.03(A)(I), the felony crime of 
Sexual Battery. (Attach. A, B, C.) In the same qse ,  the defendant 
was also convicted of Burglary. O.R.C. 2971.12(A)(3). The 
defendant received 18 months concurrent on each Sexual Battery 
charge, and 18 months consecutive on the Burglary. The 
defendant reports that he only had to serve 24 months or so of that 
sentence. For the purpose of this motion only, the defendant does 
not dispute that the Ohio charge is substantially equivalent to an 
offense listed in ldaho Code 3 18-8304(1)(a). (Attach. D.) The 
"Judgment Entry" does not recite any duty to register with the state 
of Ohio. 
(R., p. 25.) He further stipulated that he moved to ldaho in 1999, and registered 
as a sex offender in ldaho in August, 2000 because law enforcement told him 
that he was required to register. (Id.) 
The state responded to Helmuth's motion to dismiss, arguing that I.C. § 
18-8304(1)(d) applied to Helmuth's situation and that Helmuth was required to 
register because he was incarcerated in Ohio on July 1, 1993. (R., pp. 80-92.) 
Helmuth filed a reply brief. (R., pp. 95-100.) The district court granted Helmuth's 
motion to dismiss, holding that I.C. 18-8304(1)(d) did not apply to his situation 
because he was incarcerated in Ohio and not in ldaho and that, therefore, he 
was not required to register as a sex offender. (R., pp. 109-14.) The state timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 115-17.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it granted Helmuth's motion to dismiss and 
held that Helmuth was not required to register as a sex offender? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Granted Helmuth's ~ o t i o n i o  Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it granted Helmuth's motion to dismiss, ruling 
that Helmuth was not required to register as a sex offender in the state of ldaho 
because I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d) did not apply to his situation. (R., pp. 109-14.) The 
district court's decision is erroneous because the plain, unambiguous language 
of the statute clearly applies to Helmuth. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the 
application and construction of statutes. State v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 803, 
172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. O'Neiil, 118 ldaho 244, 245, 796 
, . 
P.2d 121, 122 (1990). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Granted Helmuth's Motion To Dismiss On 
The Grounds That I.C. 6 18-8304(1)(d) Did Not Apply To Out-Of-State 
Convictions 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. 
State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. Rhode, 
133 ldaho 459,462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 
365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant 
what is ,clearly stated in the statute, "[ujnless the result is palpably absurd." 
m, 133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. When the court must engage in 
statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give 
effect to that intent. Id.; State v. Groce, 133 ldaho 144, 149, 983 P.2d 217, 222 
(Ct. App. 1999); Messenger v. Burns, 86 ldaho 26,29,382 P.2d 913,915 (1963). 
To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the court examine the 
literal words of the statute, it must also examine the context of those words, the 
public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. m, 133 ldaho at 
462,988 P.2d at 688; Messenser, 86 ldaho at 29-30,382 P.2d at 915-16. 
ldaho Code 3 18-8304(1) sets forth the circumstances in which an 
individual must register as a sex offender. Specifically, the statute provides: 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any 
person who: 
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or 
an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit [an ldaho 
felony sex offense]. 
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any 
crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime 
in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the 
United States, included tribal courts and military courts, that is 
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of 
this section and enters the state to establish permanent or 
temporary residence. 
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a 
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, 
territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, 
included tribal courts and military courts, that is substantially 
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section 
and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or 
jurisdiction when he established permanent or temporary residency 
in Idaho. 
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime 
covered in this chapter prior to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a 
result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county jail facility or a 
penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after 
July I, 1993. 
(e) Is a non-resident regularly employed or working in 
ldaho or is a student in the state of ldaho and was convicted, found 
guilty or pleaded guilty to a crime covered by this chapter and, as a 
result of such conviction, finding or plea, is required to register in 
his state of residence. 
I.C. § 18-8304(1). 
The state asserts that Helmuth had a duty to register under subsection (d) 
of the statute. (R., p. 80.) On February 16, 1992, Helmuth twice committed the 
felony offense of Sexual Battery in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 
2907.03(A)(I). (R., pp. 34-35.) The defendant stipulated, for the purposes of his 
motion, that the crime was substantially similar to an Idaho offense. (R., p. 25.) 
On March 31, 1992, Helmuth pled guilty to both offenses and to the additional 
crime of burglary. (R., p. 36.) On May 15, 1992, he was sentenced to 18 months 
in prison on each of the three counts. (R., p. 37-38.) He was given credit for 90 
day previously served and ordered to serve the 18 months on the two sex 
offenses concurrent to one another. (Id.) The burglary sentence was to be 
served consecutive to the sex offense sentences. (R., p. 38.) Defendant served 
his sentence at the Loiain Correctional Institute in Ohio. (8.. p. 37.) Assuming 
that the sentences for the sexual offenses were served first, and that credit for 90 
days was given towards that 18 month sentence, Helmuth finished serving his 
sentence on the sexual offenses on approximately August 15,1993. 
Helmuth committed a "substantially equivalent" sexual offense in the state 
of Ohio prior to July 1, 1993 and was incarcerated in an Ohio penal facility for 
that offense on or after July 7 ,  1993. (see R., p. 25.) Thus, the issue is whether 
Helmuth's Ohio conviction is "a crime covered in this chapter prior to July 1, 
1993, and [Helmuth], as a result of the offense, [was] incarcerated in a county jail 
facility or a penal facility or [was] under probation or parole supervision, on or 
after July 1, 1993." I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(d). Because Helmuth was incarcerated in 
the state of Ohio for a sex offense on July 1, 1993, Helmuth had a duty to 
register as a sex offender under I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(d). 
The language in dispute reads, "a crime covered in this chapter." I.C. $$ 
18-8304(1)(d). This plain language applies to both ldaho and foreign convictions, 
as both are crimes covered in the ldaho sex offender registration statutes. 
Subsection (a) applies to an individual who is "convicted of the crime ... provided 
for [in the ldaho code]." I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(a) (emphasis added). Subsections (b) 
and (c) apply to an individual "who has been convicted of a crime ... that is 
substantially equivalent" to those listed in subsection (l)(a). I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(b) 
& (c) (emphasis added). 
Subsection (d) refers to a "crime covered in this chapter." I.C. $$ 18- 
8304(1)(d). The language of the statute is clear. Both in-state and out-of-state 
crimes are covered in Chapter 83. The statute does not distinguish between a 
"crime" committed within the state of ldaho and a "crime" committed in a 
difference jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that 
subsection (d) only applied to in-state convictions. 
Further, the fact that subsection (d) is not made specific to a particular 
jurisdiction implies that the legislature intended for it to apply to both foreign and 
in-state convictions, and not just ldaho convictions as the district court held. 
Indeed, this is the most logical reading of the statute. Because subsection (a) 
applies to ldaho convictions and because subsections (b) and (c) apply to out-of- 
state convictions, it is apparent that the "crime covered in this chapter" language 
in subsection (d) applies to both the crimes listed in subsection (a) and the 
"substantially equivalent" crimes included in (b) and (c). If the legislature had 
intended for subsection (d) to apply to only ldaho crimes, it certainly could have 
drafted that intent into the subsection. 
State v. Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514, 129 P.3d 1263 (Ct. App. 2006), 
supports the state's position. In 1990, in the state of Washington, Dickerson was 
convicted to child rape in the second degree. Dickerson, 142 ldaho at 515, 129 
P.3d at 1264. In 2002, he moved to Idaho but did not register as a sex offender. 
Id. at 515-16, 129 P.3d at 1264-65. He was charged with failing to register as a -
sex offender in 2003, in violation of former I.C. 33 18-8304 and 18-8307. Id. at 
516, 129 P.3d at 1264. He filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that he was not 
within the class of persons required to register and that if the act was interpreted 
to encompass him that it was unconstitutional as it applied to interstate travelers. 
At the time of Dickerson's conviction, I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(c) was identical to 
the current subsection (l)(d). While discussing I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(c), which is 
now subsection (l)(d), the Court noted, in dicta, that the subsection may have 
been an appropriate basis for prosecution. The court wrote: 
The State has also argued that in addition to being required 
to register under subsection (b) of I.C. $18-8304(1), Dickerson was 
required to register under subsection (c) [now subsection (d)] 
because on July 1, 1993 he was on parole for his Washington 
offense. If Dickerson was properly prosecuted under subsection 
(c), it would be unnecessary for us to reach his constitutional 
challenge to subsection (b). However, in the trial court the 
prosecution at all times proceeded under subsection (b), and never 
asserted a violation under subsection (c). Further, the record 
before us does not unequivocally show whether Dickerson was 
under parole or probation supervision in July 1993. Therefore, we 
cannot sustain Dickerson's conviction as an adjudication that fell 
within the purview of subsection (c). 
Dickerson, 142 ldaho at 518, 129 P.3d at 1267, n. 3. The Court of Appeals 
recognized that subsection (d) could provide a basis for registering offenders with 
out-of-state convictions. The Court later noted, "Although Dickerson's conviction 
for violating the Act when he moved to ldaho in 2002 must be reversed [on 
constitutional grounds], it is possible that he is currently required to register under 
the present version of the Act. See I.C. § 18-8304(1)(c), (d)." at 522, 129 
P.2d at 1271, n. 6. The Court of Appeals twice recognized that a person with an 
out-of-state conviction could be required to register under subsection ('l)(d). 
In Helmuth's case, the state proceeded under subsection (d), which was 
former subsection (c). Helmuth was incarcerated for a covered sex offense in 
Ohio in July 1993. The ldaho Court of Appeals recognized that that subsection 
(d) applies to both in-state and out-of-state convictions. Therefore, contrary to 
the district court's ruling and based on the unequivocal Dickerson language, 
Helmuth could be prosecuted under subsection (d). 
Additionally, the legislative intent of Idaho's sex offender registration 
statutes is discussed in I.C. 3 18-8302: 
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a 
significant risk of reoffense and that efforts of law enforcement 
agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations and 
quickly apprehend offenders who commit sexual offenses are 
impaired by the lack of current information available about 
individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live 
within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing 
public access to certain information about convicted sexual 
offenders assists parents in the protection of their children. Such 
access further provides a means for organizations that work with 
youth or other vulnerable populations to prevent sexual offenders 
from threatening those served by the organizations. Finally, public 
access assists the community in being observant of convicted 
sexual offenders in order to prevent them from recommitting sexual 
crimes. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist efforts of local law 
enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual 
offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to 
make certain information about sexual offenders available to the 
public as provided in this chapter. 
Every felony sex offense in ldaho requires sex offender registration. &g I.C. 5 
8304(1)(a). The legislature intended the registration statutes to be as broad and 
as inclusive as possible. Thus, the most reasonable interpretation of the statute 
is that "crime covered in this chapter" includes both in-state and out-of-state 
offenses. This is the only reading which treats all similarly situated sex offenders 
in the same manner. There is no reason why the legislature would place more 
onerous registration requirements on those who committed their crimes in ldaho 
than those who committed the same or similar crimes and then moved to the 
state. 
The district court held that the language "crime covered in this chapter" 
only includes those crimes listed in subsection (a). (R. p. 112.) It wrote: ''Flhe 
chapter referred to is chapter 83, the Sexual Offender Registration Notification 
and Community Right-To-Know Act. The only crimes listed in chapter 83 are 
found in subsection (l)(a) and those crimes are all found in title 18 of the ldaho 
Code. Therefore, under the actual language of subsection (l)(d), the registration 
requirement is only triggered if an individual has plead [sic] guilty to or been 
found guilty of a crime listed in subsection (l)(a)." (Id.) This reading is 
erroneous and contrary to the plain language of the statute. As discussed above, 
Subsection (a) includes crimes committed in the state of Idaho and subsections 
(b) and (c) include crimes committed outside of the state of ldaho. Subsection 
(d) makes no distinction between in-state and out-of-state crimes. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, no out-of-state convictions would require registration because 
such "crimes" are not "covered" by the registration statute. 
The district court used the definition of the word "incarceration" to bolster 
its assertion that subsection (d) only applied to in-state convictions. (R., p. 112.) 
"Incarceration" is defined in I.C. § 18-8303(7) as "committed to the custody of the 
ldaho department of correction or department of juvenile corrections, but 
excluding cases where the court has retained jurisdiction." Based on this 
definition, the district court held, "[tlhe legislature chose to use the word 
'incarcerated,' a form of incarceration, in subsection (l)(d) and then defined 
'incarceration' to mean being in the custody of the ldaho department of 
corrections. This is additional evidence that the legislature intended for 
subsection (l)(d) to apply to only ldaho convictions." (R., pp. 112-13.) 
This assertion is error. Unlike "incarceration," the word "incarcerated" is 
not defined in the chapter and, in construing I.C. 5 18-8304(1)(d), this court is not 
constrained by the definition of "incarceration." In I.C. § 18-8304, the word 
"incarcerated" readily applies to both in-state and out-of-state terms of 
imprisonment. This is also the most logical reading of the statute, as there is no 
reason why the legislature would confer more onerous registration requirements 
on those who committed their crimes in ldaho than individuals who commit the 
same or similar crimes elsewhere and later move to the state. 
The word "incarceration" is used in I.C. 3s 18-8303(7), 18-8306, 18-8310, 
18-8311, 18-8312, 18-8316, 18-8317, 18-8319, and 18-8329. In all but one of 
these statutes, it is apparent that the term "incarceration" can only apply to the 
state of ldaho and the ldaho department of correction, as the legislature has no 
authority beyond the state of ldaho. For example, I.C. § 18-8306 tells the 
sentencing court what it information it must provide to an individual who is 
convicted of a registerable offense in his or her court. Clearly, in this situation, 
the term "incarceration" can only apply to the ldaho department of correction, as 
the ldaho legislature has no authority to order another state what information it 
must provide to its own sex offenders. Likewise, "incarceration" can only logically 
apply to the state of ldaho in I.C. § 18-8311, which addresses the penalties for a 
violation of the chapter. Again, the legislature has no authority to order a foreign 
jurisdiction to revoke an individual's suspended sentence or probation for a 
violation of this chapter. Similarly, I.C. §§ 18-8312, 18-8316, 18-8317, and 18- 
8319 address the ldaho sexual offender classification board and steps that the 
board must take before an individual incarcerated in ldaho may be released and, 
clearly, can only apply to the ldaho department of correction. Finally, the word 
"incarceration" is used in I.C. 3 18-8329, which prohibits sex offenders from living 
near schools. Again, as the term "incarceration" is used in this statute, it can only 
apply to the state of ldaho and the ldaho department of correction. 
ldaho Code 18-8310 also uses the term "incarceration." This statute 
addresses when an individual may be exempted from the registration 
requirements. It reads, in relevant part: "Any person ... may, after a period of 
ten (10) years from the date the person was released from incarceration or 
placed on parole, supervised release or probation," petition the court to be 
released from the duty to register as a sex offender. I.C. 3 18-8310(1). 
According to the district court's logic, only an individual incarcerated in ldaho 
could qualify to be released from registration requirements. Here, clearly, the 
legislature could not have intended the ability to be exempted from registration to 
apply only to individuals who had been incarcerated in ldaho and not other 
jurisdictions. This leads to an absurd result and this interpretation of the statute 
would likely be found unconstitutional. Likewise, the district court's hyper- 
technical application of the definition of "incarceration" to the word "incarcerated" 
in I.C. 5 18-8304(1)(d) leads to an absurd result, resulting in more onerous 
reporting requirements for long-term ldaho residents than those who more 
recently move to ldaho. 
The district court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d) ignores the plain 
meaning of the words used by the legislature, and is contrary to established rules 
of statutory construction. The plain meaning of the words "crime covered in this 
chapter," as used in I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(d), encompasses both ldaho convictions 
and out-of-state convictions. Further, the use of the word "incarcerated" within 
the statute does not mandate that an individual be incarcerated in the state of 
ldaho to fall within the purview of the statute. Therefore, the district court's 
decision, which dismissed the information against Helmuth based upon an 
incorrect interpretation of the law, must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order dismissing the 
state's information be reversed 
DATED this 7'h day of April, 2010. 
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